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  11. Introduction 
The financial landscape in Europe is subject to profound changes, driven by increasing wealth 
and population aging, advances in information technology and financial market integration. 
Demographic trends and a move towards funded pension systems will boost capital markets 
and enhance the ongoing shift from traditional bank intermediation to intermediation by non-
bank institutional investors, mainly pension funds, mutual funds and life insurance companies 
(Davis 2003, Schmidt et al. 1999).  These institutional investors have become increasingly 
important as equity holders both in the American and European financial markets. Some of 
them, in particular some public pensions funds, began to abandon their traditional passive 
shareholder role and became more active participants in the governance of their corporate 
holdings (Gillan/Starks 2000, Woidtke 2002). 
This development may be seen as a move from continental European bank-based financial 
systems towards the Anglo-Saxon market-based system.
1 However, it is not necessarily a shift 
from relationship finance to arm’s length provision of finance. To the extent that institutional 
investors are active holders of shares and/or debt securities, they develop relationships with 
firms that may have features of the traditional bank-firm relationship (Perée/Riess 2003, p.24). 
Whether this shift from relationship banking to relationship investing will ultimately lead to 
efficiency gains, is an open question. In Germany, the general public is concerned about the 
dissolution of housebank relationships which are seen as valuable for the financing of small 
and medium-sized enterprises. At the same time, in the U.S. there is concern about the 
behavior of institutional investors, mutual funds being accused of hurting investors by pursuing 
their own goals (The Economist 2003a,b).  
While the benefits and costs of institutional investors’ relationships with firms are primarily 
examined within the corporate governance literature (Gillan/Starks 2000, Davis 2003) and the 
literature on efficient markets (Menkhoff 2002), the pros and cons of relationship banking are 
mainly discussed within contract theory (Boot 2000). The present paper attempts to integrate 
both forms of relationship intermediation within the contractual theory of the firm. Like the 
existence of industrial firms, the existence of financial intermediaries and their relationships 
with these firms can be explained by the incompleteness of markets. The boundaries between 
these different organizational forms are open, given that they just represent different forms of a 
nexus of contracting relationships among individuals. We will compare three alternative 
contractual relationships: (1) relationship banking (or lending) as a close relationship between 
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  2an industrial firm and a bank, resulting from long-term lending with inside information, (2) 
relationship investing as a close relationship between an industrial firm and a non-bank 
institutional investor, where direct control is exerted via large holdings of publicly traded 
shares or inside equity, (3) transaction finance (lending or investing) by publicly traded bonds 
or stocks on the capital market or by arm’s length provision of finance by intermediaries. In the 
seminal paper “What’s different about banks?” Fama (1985) explains the comparative 
advantages of banks vis-à-vis capital markets by the superior capability of banks to provide 
debt with inside information. The present paper extends this question by asking: What’s 
common to banks and non-bank institutional investors in the provision of relationship finance 
which cannot be brought about by capital markets? 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the different contractual forms of finance 
as inputs to firm production. In section 3 we show how different features of these financial 
arrangements can be explained by different contractual theories of the firm. We extend the 
governance structure theory to explain the hybrid nature of relationship intermediation and 
compare relationship banking and relationship investing as functions of asset specificity. 
Section 4 concludes. 
2. Transaction Finance versus Relationship Intermediation 
2.1 Financial Contracts and the Production Function of a Firm  
To understand the services provided by different forms of finance, we depart from the concept 
of a neoclassical production function. It usually relates firm output to capital and labor inputs, 
which are financed by the firm’s revenues. In this case of internal finance, contracts with 
external financiers are irrelevant. However, if the scarcity of internal funds limits production, 
external finance is a further production factor with positive marginal returns. Financial 
contracts with external financiers differ with respect to two fundamental inputs which they 
provide: bearing of risk and information. Therefore, we consider the more general production 
function  
q = f(risk, information),  
with q as output and f as the neoclassical production function. 
Given that individuals are risk-averse, risk can be considered as a scarce production factor with 
a positive marginal productivity (Sinn 1986). Along this line of reasoning the production 
function coincides with the efficiency line of the capital asset pricing model. The supply of the 
factor risk can be increased by different risk-bearing institutions such as insurance and stock 
markets, financial intermediaries, but also special financing relationships. As a second 
  3production factor we consider information as the knowledge or competence of the financier to 
allocate the funds to their best possible use. We presume that a financier is better informed if 
he has gathered not only publicly available information but also inside or private information 
about the state and the prospects of the firm. The higher this stock of information, the lower is 
the information asymmetry between the firm and its financier and the lower are the 
concomitant agency costs of external finance. Like a technical or an organizational progress, an 
increase in information may be described by an outward shift of the production function rather 
than a move along its frontier. 
From a macroeconomic perspective, the above production function may be used to describe the 
contributions of a whole financial system to an economy’s production capacity. The main 
problem of a financial system is not the scarcity of funds, but rather their misallocation , e.g. by 
retained earnings, hidden reserves, disposal of assets or opportunistic behavior of managers in 
the presence of asymmetric information (Hellwig 2000, Jensen 1986). The task of the financial 
system is to channel the funds not only from households to firms, but also within the corporate 
system, from X-inefficient firms to more efficient ones. The allocative competence of a 
financial system thus depends on its ability to reduce information asymmetries and provide 
possibilities of risk sharing as well as information sharing.  
The provision of risk by a financing relationship depends on the type of the contract: in a 
standard debt contract, the lender has a constant interest and capital claim and bears the risk 
that the borrower cannot repay. In the case of insolvency, the whole property rights on the firm 
are transferred to the lender. In an equity contract, on the other hand, the equity owner has a 
state-dependent claim on the residual in solvent states, bearing the residual claim risk.  
2.2 Transaction Finance and Types of Intermediation 
Both equity and debt contracts may be transaction-based or relationship-based. We define 
transaction finance as the provision of financial services by an investor or lender that 
-  focuses on a single transaction rather than multiple interactions with the same contracting 
partner; 
-  involves only publicly available information. 
Thus, transaction finance may be viewed as arm’s length finance which typically involves one-
time or short-term interactions of contracting partners without accumulation of confidential or 
private information.  
  4Transaction finance may be provided directly by individual investors who buy stocks or bonds 
issued by firms on the capital market. In this case, the investors share directly the risks of the 
projects financed, relying only on public information. Typically, their available funds are too 
small to make costly information gathering in a single firm profitable and at the same time 
reduce risk by holding a diversified portfolio of investments. Therefore, individual investors 
gain by delegating fund management and/or monitoring of borrowers to financial 
intermediaries who (1) are better informed and thus may realize a superior investment 
performance, (2) can diversify more broadly because they have larger funds, and (3) can reap 
economies of scale in investment management and/or monitoring of borrowers. In this case, 
direct finance is replaced by intermediated finance, where banks or non-bank financial 
intermediaries, so-called institutional investors, collect funds of individual investors to invest 
them in productive firms. The terms “financial intermediaries” and “institutional investors” are 
used as synonymous terms: institutional investors are investors in financial markets which are 
neither private households nor public institutions (Menkhoff 2002, p. 909). They comprise 
banks and non-bank financial intermediaries like mutual funds, pension funds, insurance 
companies or venture capital firms.  
While non-bank financial intermediaries specialize in brokerage services (like transaction 
services, screening, certification), banks
2 provide more services of qualitative asset 
transformation (like monitoring, liquidity creation and claims transformation; see 
Greenbaum/Thakor 1995, Bhattacharya/Thakor 1993). Thus, intermediation by banks differs in 
two important aspects from intermediation by non-bank institutional investors: 
-  On the liability side, banks typically take funds with standard debt contracts, called deposits, 
which are not only risk-free for depositors (because of diversification and deposit 
insurance), but also highly liquid (because of liquidity insurance). Non-bank institutional 
investors take funds with different risk-sharing contracts (e.g. mutual fund contracts, 
insurance contracts) and provide risk diversification, but not liquidity transformation. 
-  On the asset side, banks typically provide direct loans to firms whom they screen and 
monitor, while non-bank institutional investors invest in publicly traded bonds and shares or 
in private equity of the firms which they screen and monitor. 
Both types of intermediated finance also involve transaction finance, if the loans provided by 
banks and the investments of non-bank institutional investors are made at arm’s length, without 
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do not provide these services, are considered as non-bank financial intermediaries. 
  5gathering of proprietary information by repeated transactions with the same contracting 
partner. In the case of short-term, arm’s length lending by banks we speak of transaction 
lending, in the case of bond holdings and/or share holdings by non-bank institutional investors 
we speak of transaction investing. 
2.3 Relationship Intermediation  
In contrast to transaction finance, we define relationship finance as the provision of financial 
services by an investor or lender that 
-  evaluates the profitability of his or her investments through multiple interactions with the 
same customer over time and/or across products;  
-  invests in customer-specific, often proprietary information (Boot 2000, p. 10). 
Since such investments are typically made by financial intermediaries and not by individual 
savers, the term relationship finance can be equated with the term relationship intermediation. 
Relationship Banking 
The term relationship banking is not sharply defined in the literature.
3 Mostly, it is used to 
describe lending relationships of (commercial) banks, but it has also been used to address 
customer relationships of non-bank financial intermediaries.  
We define relationship banking as  
-  the above defined relationship intermediation  
-  provided by a bank.  
Since close relationships between banks and their customers typically originate from the 
lending business, relationship banking and relationship lending can be used as synonymous 
terms. In the stricter sense, the term relationship lending only involves close relationships in 
lending, while the term relationship banking encompasses relationship lending and close 
relationships from other bank services. 
According to the modern theory of financial intermediation, the benefits of relationship 
banking arise mainly from a reduction of agency and information problems by long-term 
contracts and by the use of information reusability over time. From the view of the bank, the 
proximity to the borrower facilitates its monitoring activity, thus minimizing the moral hazard 
problem of asymmetric information and providing a source of comparative advantage versus de 
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  6novo lenders and capital markets who are less informed about the borrower (Boot 2000). From 
the view of the firm, an advantage of relationship banking is that the bank is not likely to 
withdraw as soon as the first problems occur, obtaining a kind of liquidity insurance over time. 
Moreover, relationship banking helps to reduce financing constraints due to asymmetric 
information. Monitored firms can finance new projects with less informative constraints, while 
unmonitored firms, which cannot defend the viability of each project to individual investors, 
must time investments to their liquidity or internally generated funds, or to the wealth of the 
entrepreneur (Frohlin 1998). These benefits mainly accrue to small and medium-sized 
enterprises, which are informationally more opaque than large, publicly listed firms. 
Beyond lending, relationship banking includes various other financial services, e.g. deposits, 
check, clearing and cash management services. They represent both a source of revenue and 
information for the banks (Boot 2000), and help to evaluate better the riskiness of lending to a 
firm. The inside information accumulated by the bank in the course of a relationship represents 
“specific knowledge”, i.e. knowledge that is transmitted between agents only at high cost 
(Jensen/Smith 1985).  
In universal banking systems, bank-customer relationships encompass commercial banking. A 
common source of costly information is the placement of bank directors on the firms’ board of 
directors, as best exemplified by the German stylized tradition of having bankers on the boards 
of non-financial companies (Frohlin 1998). Having one or more of its managers on a client 
firm’s board is likely to provide the financial institution access to proprietary information as 
well as some influence over the firm’s actions (Booth/Deli 1999).
4 The presence of bankers on 
boards has been considered also as a “credible message” of a close firm-bank relationship 
(Schäfer 2003).
5 A banker may also be appointed on the board in order to signal to other banks 
that an expert in bank debt is on the board to protect creditors (Booth/Deli 1999).  
Relationship Investing  
We define relationship investing as  
-  the above defined relationship intermediation 
-   provided by a non-bank institutional investor. 
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information than a large creditor has, the “information gathering activity” of the single board member is 
likely to be different from the information access of large creditors. 
5 The message is credible, because on the one hand the bank risks its own funds, and on the other hand 
the bank risks its “standing”, i.e. its external image within the financial community. 
  7The term “relationship investing” has been used to describe the shareholder activism of non-
bank institutional investors in the control of publicly traded companies (Chidambaran/John 
1998, Gillan/Starks 1999). Even if they mostly invest in publicly traded securities, institutional 
investors may obtain firm-specific, private information by multiple interactions with the same 
corporate customer over time. Such relationships are likely to arise, if large share blocks are 
held in a single corporation: they increase the incentive to invest in information gathering and 
monitoring through control rights and may provide special information rights by a 
representation on the firm’s board.  
While this only applies to the financing of large corporations, the term “relationship investing” 
may also be used to describe the activities of non-bank institutional investors such as 
investment banks or venture capital firms in providing inside or private equity to smaller, non-
listed firms. The partnership between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur is characterized 
by the accumulation of firm-specific, proprietary information during the start-up and growth 
phase of the firm, where the venture capitalist provides screening and certification, funding, 
monitoring and management expertise. A venture capital contract has the following features: 
the entrepreneur cannot “walk away” after obtaining financing, the venture capitalist gains 
control of the firm after buying out the entrepreneur if a minimum performance requirement is 
not met, and both partners receive equity payoffs, if control remains with the entrepreneur 
(Greenbaum/Thakor1995, pp.68).
 6  
Thus, equity contracts are the key financial instrument of relationship investing. Even if both 
equity and debt contracts may be written by banks as well as non-bank institutional investors, 
we focus on debt contracts in the case of relationship banking and on equity contracts in the 
case of relationship investing. While bank loans, but not investments in equity are necessary 
for relationship banking, investments in equity, but not bonds are necessary for closer 
relationships between non-bank institutional investors and firms.  
Relationship investing uses different mechanisms of corporate control. Institutional investors 
that hold publicly traded shares may exercise their pressure on firms both by selling shares in 
underperforming firms or in firms that don’t follow international recognized corporate 
governance standards (“Wall Street Walk”) and by exercising direct control over the incumbent 
management of the respective firms (“voice”). Qualified investors often negotiate directly with 
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  8the managers and submit shareholder proposals only if the negotiations don’t have any relevant 
effect (Gillan/Starks 2000). When shares are held for a longer time institutions will become 
aware of the use and consequences of discretionary accounting, thus reducing incentives for the 
earning management (Chung et al. 2002). 
Shareholder activism has become an increasingly important characteristic of financial markets, 
with institutional investors willing to pay significant premiums for well governed companies, 
or significant discounts for bad governed ones (McKinsey&Co. 2000). The body of the 
research has focused on the virtues of institutional investors in forcing management to focus on 
economic performance and eschewing opportunistic self-serving behavior, even if some 
research underlined the myopia of those who focus on the short-term performance of the firm 
to the detriment of its longer-term prosperity (Chung et al. 2002)
7. The primary emphasis of 
activist shareholders has been to focus on the poorly performing firms in their portfolio and to 
pressure the management of such firms for improved performance, thus enhancing shareholder 
value (Gillan/Starks 2000).  
3. Relationship Intermediation within the Contractual Theory of the Firm 
3.1 Contractual Theories of the Firm 
Explanations for the different kinds of transaction finance and relationship intermediation and 
their contractual properties can be found in different contractual theories of the firm. Despite 
their heterogeneity, they have the common focus of explaining firms as organizations under 
two aspects: first, the substitution of short-term contracts on the product markets by long-term 
contracts between input owners, and second, the substitution of market mechanisms by 
hierarchy.
8 They may be broadly divided into two groups: principal-agency theory and 
transaction-cost theory. 
The principal-agent theory deals with bilateral contractual relationships between two partners, 
the principal and the agent, which are affected by problems of asymmetric information.
9 The 
focus is on designing an optimal contract which will motivate the agent to share his private 
information so that the action expected by the principal will be effectively realized. The 
classical agency-theory problem was posed by Berle and Means in 1932 for the public 
company with dispersed shareholders, where the separation between owners (principals) and 
managers (agents) causes agency costs by suboptimal control of the management. Within this 
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8 For overviews see Cheung (1983), Krafft/Ravix (1998), Richter/Furubotn (1997).  
  9theory, firms have been considered as “…simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set 
of contracting relationships among individuals“ (Jensen/Meckling 1976, p.325). Beyond this 
‘nexus of contracts view’ (Alchian/Demsetz 1972, Jensen/Meckling 1976, Fama 1980), another 
view is that firms are characterized by more than the legal status, since they provide a solution 
to moral hazard in teams (Alchian/Demsetz 1972, Holmström 1982). This view emphasizes the 
technology of team production, where marginal products are costly to measure, and shows the 
circumstances under which it may be optimal to appoint a monitor who has the rights to the 
residual income of the team. Another view of team production has been provided by Aoki 
(1986) and Marschak/Radner (1972), who consider a firm as a group of input owners with a 
common goal. According to this view, team production does not serve to prevent opportunism, 
but  to gather and share information under uncertainty. It emphasizes “…the image of a firm 
which must develop its resources by learning new informational relations before being able to 
use them” (Krafft/Ravix 1998, p. 248).
10
The transaction-cost theory, on the other hand, is based on the question posed by Ronald Coase 
in 1937: when do firms produce to their own need (backward, forward or lateral integration) 
and when do they procure in the market? It explains the use of markets for some transactions 
and the use of hierarchical forms of organization for others by transaction-cost differences 
between markets and hierarchies (Williamson 1988, p. 568). In contrast to the principal-agent 
theory, the focus is not on the ex ante incentive alignment of contracts under asymmetric 
information, but on the ex post governance of incomplete contracts. Since not all contingencies 
can be contractually covered, contracts are incomplete, and there is a need of adaptation to 
changing circumstances. Within this approach, the property rights theory of the firm focuses on 
the allocation of ownership as the possession of residual control rights, i.e. rights to control the 
uses of assets under contingencies that are not specified in the contract. It considers a firm as a 
collection of jointly-owned assets (Grossman/Hart 1986, Hart/Moore 1990, Hart 1995). The 
second major branch of transaction-cost theory is the governance structure approach of 
Williamson (e.g. 1975, 1979, 1985, 1988). Its basic idea is to assign transactions to alternative 
governance structures (i.e. contractual arrangements and the safeguards they embody) on the 
basis of their transaction properties, which are determined above all by the degree of asset 
specificity. 
                                                                                                                                                            
9 See Jensen/Meckling (1976), Alchian/Demsetz (1972), Fama (1980), Holmström (1982). 
10 This team theory has been considered as an extension instead of an alternative to the principal-agent 
theory, since the agents are still optimizing, making their decisions on the basis of imperfect 
  10As shown in figure 1, these contractual theories of the firm yield different, complementary 
explanations for financial contracts, intermediaries and relationships, to be examined below. 
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Figure 1:  Explanation of financial contracts and intermediaries by contractual 
theories of the firm 
3.2 Principal Agent Theory and Financial Intermediation 
3.2.1 Nexus of Contracts and Delegation to Financial Intermediaries 
Within the agency-theoretic nexus of contracts view, firms come into existence as 
intermediaries that reduce the number of direct market contracts between individuals and the 
associated contracting and monitoring costs. Likewise, the existence of financial 
intermediaries, and their special relationships with contracting partners, can be explained by 
their functions of delegated contracting and monitoring on behalf of individual investors. If 
they have gathered specific information about borrowers or investment projects, the reusability 
of this information can be used to reap economies of scale in long-run relationships.  
                                                                                                                                                            
information, where the variables designating the optimum form of organization are all known 
(Krafft/Ravix 1998, p. 251). 
  11The new theory of financial intermediation (see e.g. Diamond 1984, Allen 1990) shows that 
banks are financial intermediaries which can solve specific information and incentive problems 
in the relationships with savers and investors better than this could be done by non-bank 
financial intermediaries or direct financing. Within the theory of asymmetric information, 
Diamond (1984) shows that a special role of banks is to minimize the agency costs between 
borrowers and lenders by monitoring the borrowers at low cost, while Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) find another special function of banks in their role of transforming illiquid assets into 
liquid liabilities, providing insurance against liquidity risk with private information to agents.  
Diamond and Rajan (2001) show that relationship lending is the best way to create efficient 
monitoring and maximum liquidity simultaneously. Real assets or projects are illiquid, because 
the entrepreneur can always threaten to withhold his specific skills in the future and thus 
capture a rent. A relationship lender who has gained knowledge about the project has a better 
liquidation threat than any other financier and thus can extract a larger fraction of the cash 
flows generated. When the relationship lender is a bank, issuing demand deposits, it cannot 
hold up depositors by not paying them the promised amount. Demand deposits are fixed claims 
with a sequential service constraint, where the depositors get their money back until the bank 
runs out of money. Any attempt by the bank to extort a rent from depositors by threatening to 
withdraw her specific abilities would cause a run, where the depositors demand back their 
money simultaneously without renegotiating. Hence, the fragility of the bank’s deposits 
ensures that the bank provides the maximum amount of credit it can offer.  
Non-bank institutional investors, in contrast, do not create liquidity and hence do not have this 
disciplinary mechanism of runs. A depositor of a mutual fund has the right to seize that 
proportion of assets that equals his proportion of total deposits. Thus, the holdings are marked 
to market and the mutual fund is run-proof. If mutual funds are actively engaged in monitoring, 
providing relationship investing, depositors are not able to discipline them and the managers 
may capture rents. This applies also to insurance firms that unlike banks, provide payments 
only when liquidity needs are observable and verifiable.
11 Also investment banks or venture 
capitalists differ from commercial banks in this respect: because their value lies largely in 
future transactions, they cannot be efficiently cut out of the deal, hence demand deposits are 
unlikely to provide discipline (Diamond/Rajan 2001, pp. 317). 
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amount even if the insurable event does not occur, making them prone to runs. 
  12A problem with both relationship banking and relationship investing is that the delegation of 
monitoring to an intermediary involves by itself agency costs, so-called delegation costs. In the 
case of relationship banking, they arise from the asymmetric information between bank 
managers and bank depositors/shareholders, while in the case of relationship investing, they 
arise from the asymmetric information between institutional investors and their funds’ 
beneficial owners. According to Diamond (1984), the delegation costs for bank depositors go 
to zero, if the bank is large enough to diversify its loan portfolio so that the depositors are 
shielded from credit risk. This results from the debt contracts of banks, so that a similar 
conclusion cannot be drawn for the equity contracts of (non-bank) institutional investors.  
While the theory of financial intermediation is unanimous about optimal debt contacts, it is 
indeterminate about the effects of delegated monitoring in the case of sub-optimal equity 
contracts (Schneider 2000, p. 215). Institutional owners function as principals to corporate 
managements and as agents for their beneficial owners or as ‘agents monitoring other agents’. 
Within this ‘nexus agency model’ it has been argued that institutional investors are complex 
organizations which pursue their own goals and the goals of their stakeholders apart from those 
of beneficial owners (Schneider 2000). Additional agency costs result from detrimental 
incentives that divert the behavior away from maximizing investment performance: especially 
the requirement to conform with short-term evaluations leads to short-term orientation, 
distorted risk consideration and useless activities (Menkhoff 2002). Whether these additional 
agency costs outweigh the cost reductions brought about by intermediation cannot be answered 
a priori, because it depends on the effectiveness of the legal and regulatory environment and 
the governance mechanisms in protecting the interests of the beneficial owners. Empirical 
studies that concentrate on non-bank institutional investors that invest in US stock portfolios 
show that their investment performance is usually below the market benchmark. While they 
realize advantages of diversification, they fail to realize information advantages. The benefits 
of improved corporate governance go along with costs of generating short-term strategies, 
increased volatility and less sensitivity toward social issues in the managed companies. The 
agency costs depend on the type of institutional investor, e.g. pension funds having higher 
agency costs than mutual funds (Menkhoff 2002, Schneider 2000). 
3.2.2 Relationship Intermediation as Team Production 
As argued by Alchian and Woodward (1987, p. 118), “…long-term, or what the law calls 
relational, contracts are essential to continuity of teamwork with dependent resources”. 
Moreover, “Teamwork seldom appears without a nexus of contracts, and a nexus of contracts 
  13seldom appears in the absence of teamwork ” (Alchian/Woodward, 1987, p.111). Hence, long-
term contracts of  financial intermediaries should involve elements of team production. 
According to Aoki, a cooperative team or organization could be considered a system for 
allocating the resources better than a sequel of unique transactions, above all due to the saving 
of risk cost, the reduction of shirking and the enhancement of informational efficiency in 
regulating the formation and utilization of the team element of human resources (Aoki 1984, p. 
30). Cooperation in production is a cooperation between suppliers of inputs (Alchian 1993, p. 
367). Applied to relationship banking, we may consider it as a cooperation within a team 
constituted by the bank and the firm in supplying risky capital and information. Within such a 
team, the borrowing firm must be willing to provide information about investment 
opportunities and risks to the bank, which in turn provides capital and risk bearing to the firm. 
According to Alchian and Woodword (1987), teams arise where information is costly: 
gathering information about the borrower is likely to be a very resource expensive process, and 
relationship banking rests on information cost savings.  
The informational efficiency of utilizing special human resources in lending relationships is 
not only brought about by the bank’s inside information, but also by social interactions 
between loan officers and firm managers which may create mutual understanding and trust. 
Empirical studies on relationship lending show that such social interactions do indeed lead to 
more favorable lending terms for small and medium-sized firms in Germany (Harhoff/Körting 
1998, Lehmann/Neuberger 2001). Differences in lending teams brought about by different 
histories or development levels might explain why we observe lending gaps between different 
regions of the same country (Ferri/Messori 2000, Lehmann et al. 2004). 
Also relationship investing can involve a kind of team production, considering the cooperation 
between firms and institutional investors to share information and equity risks. This applies 
above all to the relationships of firms with venture capitalists, but less to those with 
institutional investors that invest only in publicly traded shares and are less likely to have long-
term, social interactions with firm managers. As already mentioned above, these institutional 
investors do not seem to reap efficiency gains by information advantages. 
3.3. Transaction Cost Theory and Financial Relationships 
3.3.1 Property Rights Theory and Control Rights of Financiers 
According to Berle and Means (1932) conflicts of interest arise between managers and residual 
claimants when risk bearing is separated from management of the firm. The resulting agency 
costs connected with different control rights of the external financiers are the main objects of 
  14corporate governance studies
12. The role of banks and non-bank institutional shareholders’ 
activism arises due to the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders, and to the 
free rider problems connected with the lack of incentives for small investors in monitoring. 
Investors with large blocks appear to be the only ones which have the incentives to undertake 
such monitoring activities, as it is more likely that the large shareholders’ increased return from 
monitoring is sufficient to cover the associated monitoring costs (Gillan/Starks 2000). 
When a firm is financed partially with debt moral hazard arises, because the equity holders 
don’t bear the full consequence of negative outcomes, while enjoying the full positive 
consequences of their decisions. The main sources of conflicts are a redistribution from 
bondholders to stockholders that would arise from an increase in dividend payout, higher 
leverage, substitution of high-risk for low risk projects (asset substitution), and 
underinvestment in projects that would yield a higher benefit to bondholders (Jensen/Smith 
1985). This bondholder vs. stockholder conflict would not be solved simply by giving the 
bondholders control over the firm: bondholders would have incentives to pay too few 
dividends, issue too little debt, and choose projects with too little risk. Within the theoretical 
frame of state-dependent control, the control over the firm should be exerted by shareholders in 
non-default states and by creditors in default states. In the event of the borrower’s default, it is 
efficient to delegate the control to banks, to bundle the creditors’ claims and reduce costs of 
free-riding by bondholders (Aghion/Bolton 1992). In non-default states, corporate control 
should be exerted by financial intermediaries that hold large blocks, thus bundling the interests 
of dispersed shareholders and preventing actions of firm managers against the interests of 
minority shareholders and bondholders. This may also be done by banks via voting rights from 
equity holdings, proxy voting rights or supervisory board mandates. Equity holdings by banks 
reduce their incentives to pose creditor over shareholder interests, providing a solution to the 
bondholder vs. shareholder conflict (Stiglitz 1985). 
Thus, relationship banking may reduce not only the agency costs of external debt by 
monitoring borrowers in long-term relationships, but also the agency costs of external equity. 
However, given the fact that a bank’s debt claims are mostly bigger than its share blocks in a 
firm, it is rational for it to act primarily in the creditor interests, and the effectiveness of banks 
as actively monitoring in the shareholder interests is still an open question (Boehmer 2000). 
According to Schäfer (2003) relationship banking and a bank’s control over a firm “are just the 
two sides of the same coin”: she provides examples on how this “domination” could affect the 
                                                 
12 See e.g. Shleifer/Vishny (1997), La Porta et al. (1999). 
  15management incentives and the banks’ incentives to monitor the managers of the “supposed to 
be” controlled company.  
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argued that the greater is the degree to which shares are 
concentrated in the hands of outside shareholders, the more effectively management behavior 
should be monitored and disciplined. This seems to be the case for the role of banks as external 
monitors in Continental Europe. Dherment-Ferere et al. (2001) found a positive disciplining 
effect of qualified banking share blocks, while Lehmann and Weigand (2000) found that 
financial institutions as largest shareholders of traded corporations enhanced profitability. 
Baums (1994) argues that the presence of major lenders in the board could limit the managers’ 
ex post moral hazard. When the stock market is (ab-)used by managers the awareness of being 
monitored can reflect in an excessive myopia of the managers. The presence of long-term 
shareholders prevents such behavior, at least as long as they perform a real monitoring activity.  
Also in market-based financial systems with less control rights of banks, relationship banking 
lowers agency costs of external finance. Jensen (1986) argues that debt financing reduces free 
cash flow and therefore has a disciplinary effect on management: managers can use high 
leverage to signal credibly that they maximize profits. Likewise, any disciplinary impact 
creditors have on management should be the greatest when a large fraction of debt is bank 
debt. This is backed by empirical evidence: stock prices respond positively and significantly 
especially to announcements of bank loans (James 1987, Lummer/McConnell 1989), and the 
cost of issuing public securities is significantly lower for firms with borrowing relationships to 
banks (James/Wier 1990, Datta et al. 1999). This evidence about the uniqueness of bank loans 
makes clear that relationship banking is superior to relationship investing in reducing agency 
costs of external finance: non-bank institutional investors may only lower agency  costs of 
external equity by active monitoring in the interest of shareholders.  
3.3.2 Governance Structure Theory and Relationship Intermediation 
According to Williamson’s governance structure theory, the comparative advantage of an 
organizational form depends on the attributes of transactions and on the attributes and purposes 
of the alternative modes of governance. Important attributes of transactions are asset 
specificity, which gives rise to bilateral dependency, and uncertainty, which poses adaptive 
needs. A governance structure is defined by the attributes of incentive intensity, administrative 
control and the contract law regime. Compared to market governance, hierarchical governance 
is characterized by lower incentive intensity, more numerous and discretionary administrative 
controls and internal dispute resolution instead of court ordering (Williamson 2002, p. 180). 
  16Since the need for coordinated adaptations rises as asset specificity deepens, the comparative 
transaction cost of markets versus hierarchies are a function of asset specificity. For medium 
values of asset specificity, hybrid modes of organizations arise as “market-preserving credible 
contracting modes that possess adaptive attributes located between classical markets and 
hierarchies” (Williamson 2002, p. 181). 
This model has been applied to corporate finance and governance by distinguishing among 
individual investment projects in terms of their asset specificity and considering debt and 
equity as two distinct governance structures (Williamson 1988, 2002). There, asset specificity 
deepens as the assets in question become less redeployable. To explain relationship finance as 
a governance structure, we will regard a second kind of asset specificity: the information 
opaqueness of the projects to be financed. Combining both kinds of asset specificity, we will 
explain relationship banking and relationship investing as distinct modes of governance, which 
are both hybrids between markets and hierarchies. Figure 2 shows the comparative costs of 
governance for different kinds of asset specificity. 
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Figure 2: Comparative costs of governance for different kinds of asset specificity 
Let k
j be an index of asset specificity which indicates that assets are more specific as they are 
less redeployable (non-redeployability k
N) or that assets are more specific as they are more 
informationally opaque (information opaqueness k




j) illustrate the transaction cost functions of markets (M), hierarchies (H) and hybrids (X), 
respectively. Thus, transaction costs are minimized by markets for low levels of k
j, by 
hierarchies for high levels of k
j and by hybrids for medium levels of k
j. 
For the case of asset specificity measured by non-redeployability (j = N), debt finance is a kind 
of market-like governance mode, while equity is a kind of hierarchical form of governance: 
Debt is a governance structure that works almost entirely out of rules, with fixed interest and 
capital claims in solvent states and a claim on the liquidation value of the financed project if 
the scheduled payments cannot be made. Equity finance, by contrast, is a more complex 
governance mode with lower incentive intensity and greater discretion. Therefore, the setup 
cost of debt D(0) are lower than that of equity E(0). Since the value of a debt claim depends on 
the redeployability of the financed assets in the case of default, the terms of debt finance will 
worsen as asset specificity deepens. This rise in the cost of capital can be reduced by equity 
finance that provides interfirm contractual safeguards for less-redeployable assets. Especially, 
the board of directors with its monitoring and controlling functions is such a safeguard. As the 
need for adaptation rises with rising asset specificity, the costs of the more adaptable equity 
governance regime will rise less rapidly as k
N increases. Accordingly, D’(k
N) > E’(k
N) in figure 
2. Hence, it is optimal to use debt finance for highly redeployable assets and equity finance for 
highly non-redeployable assets. For intermediate levels of redeployability, transaction costs 
could hypothetically be minimized by creating a financial instrument called dequity, that 
combines rules with discretion (Williamson 1988, p. 581). It would have the property that the 
constraining features of debt are the norm from which selective relief by the board of directors 
is permitted. The respective transaction cost function is δ (k
N) in figure 2.  
Now, let us consider the case that the projects to be financed do not differ with respect to their 
redeployability, but to their information opaqueness (j = O).  If there is no information opacity 
and the success properties of an investment project are publicly known, the project can be 
financed at arm’s length on the capital market (transaction finance T(k
O)). If, at the other 
extreme, asymmetric information between an entrepreneur and potential financiers is 
prohibitively high to render external finance feasible, the project in question must be financed 
internally, i.e. by a hierarchical mode of governance (internal finance I(k
O)). Since, however, 
this case of vertical integration between a firm and its suppliers of finance is rare, it only serves 
as a theoretical reference point. In the following, we will consider only levels of information 
opacity below the boundary level 
_
k 2
O, where relationship finance by intermediaries R(k
O) is an 
alternative to transaction finance T(k
O). Relationship finance by intermediaries is a more 
hierarchical mode of governance than transaction finance by markets. Because of added 
  18bureaucratic or delegation costs, R(0) > T(0), but the cost differences between transaction 
finance on the market and relationship finance through intermediaries narrow as information 
opacity increases and the need for cooperative adaptation rises. The costs of transaction finance 
will rise more rapidly as k
O increases, T’(k
O) > R’(k
O), because efficient capital markets will 
price out the risks implied by asymmetric information, whereas relationship finance provides 




relationship finance has a comparative cost advantage. Safeguards for investments in 
informationally opaque assets include gathering of inside information, monitoring and 
verification procedures, penalties (such as liquidation) and specialized dispute resolution (such 
as renegotiation). In the following, we will argue that relationship investing in publicly traded 
shares is a governance structure that provides less of these safeguards and thus is more market-
like and should be chosen for lower levels of information opacity than relationship banking.
13
Relationhip investing in publicly traded shares is a more rule-based governance structure than 
relationship banking. Capital issued as public equity is a long-term claim with no other right 
but to liquidate the equity-financed project at any point in time. The decision to do so by 
selling shares may be based on public or private information. By holding large equity blocks 
over a longer time period, institutional investors may gather private information and exercise 
direct control over the management, reducing the moral hazard risk of asymmetric information. 
However, the use of private information by institutional investors is restricted by insider 
trading regulations, to avoid that managers and relevant shareholders collude in order to trade 
at the expense of “uninformed” or “small” shareholders (Maug, 2002). Because non public 
corporate information may temporarily reduce the liquidity of an institution’s investments, 
little corporate monitoring is to be expected from institutional investors (Dherment-Ferere et al. 
2001). Admati et al. (1994) demonstrate that in equilibrium the monitoring activity is below 
the optimal level. The fact is that every investor faces a trade-off between the benefits of 
diversification and the benefits associated with monitoring a firm. Maug (1998, p. 89) 
demonstrates that the probability of monitoring increases in the liquidity of the market, since 
market liquidity allows also large investors to benefit from monitoring, and helps to overcome 
the free-rider problem. 
                                                 
 
13 For empirical evidence on a financing hierarchy according to information opacity in credit markets 
see Shin/Kolari (2004) and Carey et al. (1998). 
  19Relationship banking provides higher incentives to monitor informationally opaque firms. 
Whereas the right to liquidate an equity investment at any time is likely to shorten the time 
horizon, a long-term lender is committed to the borrowing firm until the loan comes due. 
Moreover, relationship banking is a relatively complex and adaptable governance regime with 
comparatively greater discretion due to the possibility of intertemporal contract design and 
renegotiability as well as the special safeguards of restrictive covenants and collateralization. 
One benefit of relationship lending is seen in its intertemporal contract design, where the long-
term binding of the borrower to the bank enables the bank to compensate losses in some 
periods by gains in other periods.
14 This permits the funding of relationship loans or financing 
of long-term investment projects that would not be profitable in a shorter lending relationship 
(Boot 2000, Ongena/Smith 2000). Moreover, when firms have financial or industrial problems 
they look for help by their relation bank or housebank. They know that their housebank, having 
made costly investments in order to build up a long-term relationship, would not have an 
advantage in letting the client go bankrupt (Macey/Miller 1995, Das/Nanda 1999). Indeed, 
housebanks are more committed to their clients, providing more finance if the firm faces 
sudden and temporary difficulties (Elsas/Krahnen 1998, p. 1284). Thus, like long-term labor 
contracts, long-term lending relationships are a kind of implicit contract, in which banks offer 
to relieve their borrowers of some market risks in return for the right to make allocative 
decisions.
15 They result from bargaining between the bank and the borrowing firm over sharing 
the returns of their relation specific investments. The provision of risk by an implicit long-term 
loan contract implies that the bank’s claims in solvent states are no longer state-independent as 
in the standard case of rule-based debt considered above.  
Since an incomplete contract does not specify rules for each possible state of the world, the 
optimal contract should be structured to provide incentives to both parties to take mutual 
beneficial actions. In relationship lending, this is done by the possibility of renegotiations. 
While in the case of arm’s length debt the borrower cannot credibly commit to liquidate its 
firm in a distress situation, the power of its housebank to renegotiate will lead to more efficient 
decisions about firm liquidation or continuation (Rajan 1992). This can be interpreted as a kind 
                                                 
14 See e.g. Greenbaum et al. (1989), Petersen/Rajan (1995). For a detailed discussion of the theoretical 
literature see Elsas (2001, pp.56). 
15 An implicit contract describes complex agreements, written and tacit, which govern the exchange of 
(labor) services when various types of (job-)specific investments inhibit (labor) mobility, and 
opportunities to shed risks are limited by imperfect markets for contingent claims (Azariadis 1990, p. 
132). By forming such relational contracts, the parties generally commit to some common goal rather 
than to a specific course of conduct (Boatright 2002). 
  20of insurance service provided by the housebank: the ex ante choice of relationship lending 
prevents negative value effects of opportunistic behavior by one contract partner, which cannot 
be prevented by alternative financial arrangements (Elsas 2001, p. 26). 
 According to Chemanur and Fulghieri (1994) banks use the ability to renegotiate as a means to 
acquiring reputation. Reputation building provides the bank with the incentive to establish a 
long-term relationship with a firm.
16 In their model, banks also have the choice between 
liquidating the firm when distressed or renegotiating the loan contract. Banks wishing to 
establish a reputation for financing productive firms, monitor the firms more intensively, which 
in turn leads to more efficient continuation decisions in renegotiations (Ongena/Smith 2000). 
Bester and Scheepens (1996, p. 571) underline that in the long-run the advantages connected 
with establishing a debt history can overcome the costs associated with an initial debt. Their 
result contrasts to the first argument of the pecking order hypothesis of Myers and Majluf 
(1984), according to which internal finance should be preferred to bank debt. They consider the 
decision to finance an investment by bank debt rather than by internal funds. In taking into 
account the costs associated with bank debt, side by side with the advantages of establishing a 
positive debt history, we expect that if the bank relationship is publicly observable, the 
reputation for both the bank and the firm improves as the length of the relationship increases.
17 
On the one hand, bank relationships are credible signals, since the bank places its own wealth 
and its own reputation at the borrower’s disposal (Collin 1997, Stiglitz 1985). On the other 
hand, the longevity of the relationship should not be informative for new entrants since 
competitors don’t know the prices and the terms associated with the relationship. Thus the 
incumbent bank may have a long relationship with a very risky borrower only because the bank 
is able to be compensated by an appropriate interest rate (Greenbaum et al. 1989). 
Special safeguards for banks that finance informationally opaque firms by loans are restrictive 
covenants and collateral. Restrictive covenants are provisions in the loan contract that restrict 
and specify certain activities that the borrower can engage in (Mishkin 1995, p. 209). Collateral 
is property that is pledged to the lender to guarantee payment in the event of default. Longhofer 
and Santos (1998) show that by increasing the seniority of the bank’s debt claims, inside 
collateral provides incentives for efficient monitoring in distress situations, since in such states 
                                                 
16 Generally, reputation is an incentive mechanism for long-term implicit contracts: “if somebody 
deviates from the terms of the contract, the deviation becomes widely known, and the deviant finds it 
difficult to locate trading partners in the future” (Azariadis 1990, p. 138).  
17 Also the status of the committed part (e.g. an international bank vs a regional one) may be a source of 
reputation (Schäfer 2003), or at least of creditworthiness (Collin 1997, Ferri/Messori 2000). 
  21the most senior claimant benefits first from improving the quality of the firm, “…and it is in 
such states that the true value of relationship lending comes to light. If banks are made junior 
to other creditors, they will have little incentive to build a relationship that might allow them to 
determine the value of such an investment” (Longhofer/Santos 1998, p. 2). If there are more 
than one debt claimant, it may be optimal to determine the structure of seniority strategically ex 
ante, anticipating future renegotiations in which conflicts between the different claimants are 
likely to cause net welfare losses. Such losses may be reduced by allocating ex ante the 
strongest bargaining position to the debt claimant which is expected to have the highest 
bargaining power ex post, by increasing his or her seniority (Welch 1997). Banks and 
especially inside banks are likely to be such claimants, because they have comparative 
advantages vis-à-vis bondholders or outside banks in organizing distress situations, having 
built up law departments or special reorganization capacities. Hence, housebanks with the most 
inside information should obtain the highest seniority position by inside collateral (Elsas 2001, 
p. 191). 
These benefits of relationship banking in the financing of informationally opaque firms, 
however, go along with costs due to two problems: the hold-up problem and the soft budget 
constraint problem. Hold-up results from the information monopoly the bank generates in the 
course of lending, that may allow it to make loans to the borrower at non-competitive terms in 
the future. Sharpe (1990) argues that bank relationships arise in competitive loan markets 
because a bank, which has privately observed customer quality, can “lock in” the customer, 
and charge above-cost interest rates, while Greenbaum et al. (1989) provide a further 
explanation when considering the costs borne by the firm in searching for competing bank 
offers. Also collateral may cause hold-up, because it can be considered as a commitment on the 
part of a borrower to accept only one contract (Parlour and Rajan 2001). Because of this 
“central conflict between commitment and competition” (Mayer 1988, p. 1179), the 
informational advantage of the inside bank is a “double-edged-sword” (Rajan 1992, p. 1369).  
The soft budget constraint problem results from the potential lack of toughness of the bank in 
enforcing credit contracts that may come alongside with relationship banking proximity (Boot 
2000). A relationship bank is unable to commit not to refinance unprofitable projects ex post, 
in particular when the borrower faces financial problems. In time of financial distress a 
relationship bank may extent further credit even to unprofitable projects in the hope of 
recovering its initial loan. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) argue that multiple banking may 
represent a solution, as it offers a way for banks not to commit to refinance unprofitable 
projects, or worst, gambling for resurrection projects, while Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) 
  22show that multiple banking complicates debt renegotiations due to communication problems 
and asymmetry of information among the different creditors. As a consequence, Carlin and 
Mayer (2000) argue that multibank systems are superior in imposing tough budget constraints 
on inefficient projects but the other side of the coin is, they are too myopic and fail to sustain 
efficient long term projects characterized by short term uncertainty.  
To the extent that relationship investing involves a binding of an institutional investor to a 
firm, the hold-up problem and the soft budget constraint problem arise here, too. Such a 
binding may be caused by the holding of large blocks. Traditionally one way for unsatisfied 
shareholders of an underperforming firm is to sell out the shares. The fact is that often the 
holdings are so large that the shares cannot be sold without driving the price down and 
suffering further losses, so they are less marketable (Chung et al. 2002). As a consequence, 
institutional investors face a trade off between keeping underperforming shares and suffering a 
long-term loss or selling out the shares and suffering a sudden loss. If they keep the shares, 
they find themselves in a hold-up situation and the firm managers may exploit their lock-in by 
opportunistic behavior. Proponents of institutional investors’ activism argue that as a 
consequence such activity focuses on the long term and in doing so it helps management to 
improve long-term performance. As in the case of relationship banking, the binding is a 
“double-edged-sword”. The soft budget constraint problem may arise from a potential lack of 
toughness of the relationship investor in controlling managers on behalf of shareholders. 
Opponents of the institutional investors’ activism maintain that the activism detracts from the 
primary duties of asset management’s managers, which is managing money for investors or 
other beneficiaries (Gillan/Starks 2000). Jarrow and Leach (1991) note that fiduciaries are 
confronted with conflicting interests and must determine whether to maximize their own 
wealth or that of the beneficiaries. Some authors note that institutions that maintain business 
relationships with firms may be biased in favor of management in matters pertaining to control 
(Coffee 1991).
18
Finally, our results for the two kinds of asset specificity can be combined in a matrix (figure 3). 
The arrows indicate that the need for coordinated adaptations rises not only as asset specificity 
deepens, but also as the frequency of transactions and the uncertainty of the environment 
increase. Transaction finance by bonds or arm’s length debt (field 1) results as the most 
                                                 
18 A good example is provided by Berglöf and Sjögren (1998) who presented a model with a bank 
proving loans to a borrower while an investment company, controlled by the bank, holds a relevant 
block in the borrower company. Baums (1996) found a high correlation between the underwriting and 
  23market-like governance mode which should be chosen to finance investment projects with 
easily redeployable assets and publicly known return prospects in a stable environment. A 
prototype are tangible investments in large, publicly listed firms in mature industries. At the 
other extreme, the most hierarchical governance mode of external finance is relationship 
investing in inside equity (field 6) as done by venture capital firms to finance young, 
innovative firms with high information opacity and intangible assets (such as R&D) in new or 
growth industries. For small and medium-sized firms with high information opaqueness and 
easily redeployable assets, located in traditional industries with less uncertainty, relationship 
banking minimizes transaction cost (field 5). Relationship investing through large share 
holdings can be optimal for publicly listed firms with medium information opaqueness (fields 3 
and 4). If these belong to stable industries with tangible assets, debt should be the dominant 
form of finance. Hence, in this case, relationship banking with inside debt and relationship 
investing with bonds and large share holdings are substitutes (field 3).  
Moreover, we may observe a simultaneous occurrence of some financing modes, i.e. 
combinations of single fields in figure 3. For example, universal banks in Germany that hold 
large share blocks in the firms to which they provide housebank services function as 
relationship lenders and investors simultaneously (fields 3, 4 and 5). A combination of 
relationship lending by a housebank with arm’s length debt from outside banks helps to 
optimally balance the risk of lender coordination failure from transaction banking and the hold-
up risk of relationship banking (fields 1 and 3). Thus, Elsas et al. (2004) showed that with 
increasing non-redeployability of assets, firms should choose multiple lenders with a co-
existence of arm’s length financiers and a relationship bank. Likewise, a mix of private bank 
debt and public debt seems to be optimal for informationally opaque firms with high growth 
opportunities to reduce the costs of a hold up.
19
                                                                                                                                                            
investment policy of bank controlled investment companies and the role of the bank as coordinator of 
the IPO.  
19 See the empirical evidence provided by Houston/James (1996) for U.S. firms. 
























































































































Figure 3: Optimal forms of finance for different combinations of asset specificity 
 
5. Conclusion 
The shift from bank intermediation to intermediation by non-bank institutional investors which 
we observe in continental Europe has invoked concern about the dissolution of valuable long-
term bank-firm relationships and their replacement by arm’s length finance. However, non-
bank institutional investors are also actively engaged in the firms they finance, providing a 
kind of relationship finance. The present paper made a first attempt to compare relationship 
banking as a close bank-firm relationship and relationship investing as a close relationship 
between a non-bank institutional investor and an industrial firm to examine their common 
features and relative merits. We used different contractual theories of the firm to compare both 
types of relationship finance in terms of finance and corporate governance. Within the 
governance structure approach, we showed that both are hybrid forms between market and 
hierarchy, whose comparative advantages depend on the occurrence of two kinds of asset 
specificity.  
  25We conclude that the shift from bank finance to finance by non-bank institutional investors is 
neither a shift from relationship finance to arm’s length finance nor a shift from hierarchical to 
market governance. Relationship banking and investing are complements to finance and 
control firms with different asset specificity in distinct environments, so that both are needed 
for an efficient division of labor. Relationship investing can be an efficient substitute for 
relationship banking only for some firms and industries.  
The comparative advantage of relationship investing by venture capital firms lies in the 
provision of equity (bearing of residual-claim risk) to innovative, start-up firms, whereas 
relationship banking has its comparative advantage in the debt financing (bearing of insolvency 
risk) of informationally opaque small and medium-sized firms in more mature markets or 
traditional industries. For these firms, relationship banking delivers unique monitoring and 
insurance services by implicit contracts. 
Large companies, on the other hand, may profit from relationship finance by both banks and 
non-bank institutional investors (insurance firms, pension funds, mutual funds), if these hold 
large blocks of their publicly traded shares to exercise corporate control. Here, however, non-
bank intermediaries seem to be an imperfect substitute for banks: First, their incentives to 
actively invest in long-term relationships are lower because of a conflict between the use of 
inside information and the liquidity of their investments. Secondly, their disciplinary effect on 
management tends to be lower than that of banks. Third, since they do not provide liquidity, 
they are less disciplined by their depositors to provide efficient delegated monitoring. The 
costs of delegation to non-bank institutional investors are comparatively high, because they 
have more scope to pursue their own goals apart from those of their funds’ beneficial owners.  
Finally, the substitutability between relationship banking and investing depends on the 
regulatory environment and the development of the capital markets: the higher the number of 
publicly listed firms, the higher the disclosure of information and the higher market liquidity, 
the more efficient is relationship investing compared to relationship banking. The present paper 
developed a theoretical framework for more comparative research in this regard. 
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